We study the impact of social identity on worker competition by exploiting the exogenous variations in workers' origins and the well-documented social divide between urban resident workers and rural migrant workers in large urban Chinese firms. We collect data on weekly output, individual characteristics, and coworker composition for all weavers in an urban Chinese textile firm between April 2003 and March 2004. The firm's relative performance incentive scheme rewards a worker for outperforming her coworkers. We find that a worker does not act on the monetary incentives to outperform coworkers who share the same social identity, but does aggressively compete against coworkers with a different social identity. Our results highlight the important role of social identity in overcoming self-interest and enhancing inter-group competitions. * The data were collected in collaboration with Xiao-Yuan Dong and Derek C. Jones to whom we are most grateful (see Dong et al. (2007) for details on the data). We benefitted greatly from comments from
Introduction
Social identity theory suggests that individuals derive part of their self-concept from their perceived membership in a social group and behave differently towards in-group versus out-group members (Tajfel et al., 1971; Tajfel and Turner, 1979) . Social identity can play a significant role in economic decision making, leading to seemingly irrational economic behaviors (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000) . Despite the importance of social identity in organizational contexts (Hogg and Terry, 2000) , most of the empirical evidence on the impact of social identity comes from lab experiments, and there exist few studies on the impact of social identity on worker behaviors in real economic contexts.
In this paper we provide novel evidence of the impact of social identity on worker competition in a Chinese textile firm that uses relative performance incentives. Using detailed individual-level productivity data, we investigate these specific questions: How does a worker's social identity affect her response to relative performance incentives? Do workers always try to outperform each other, or do they compete differently against coworkers with whom they share a common social identity? Since an individual's social identity can originate from multiple sources and depend on an organization's demographic composition (Chattopadhyay et al., 2004) , it can be empirically difficult to measure social identity. We overcome this challenge by identifying a unique setting where a well-documented, exogenously-formed, deep social divide separates otherwise similar workers. Like many typical urban Chinese manufacturing firms, the firm in our study employs rural migrant workers and urban resident workers. We argue that the deep-rooted social and historical institutions in China create powerful group identities in the workplace, where workers are more likely to identify with other workers of the same rural or urban status (Afridi et al., 2012) . Other than their rural or urban status, the 287 workers in our sample have almost homogeneous demographic characteristics: all but nine of them are female; they are all Han Chinese; and all of them have graduated from middle school but not high school. They work in 18 different departments defined by location and shift.
Our workers are paid based on a combination of absolute and relative performances.
By rewarding workers for outperforming their coworkers within the same department, the relative performance schemes tend to lead to intensified competition, diminished cooperation, and sometimes even sabotage among participants (Lazear, 1989; Drago and Garvey, 1998; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2005 , 2008 , 2011 Carpenter et al., 2010) . The presence of strong social identity suggests that a worker may compete differently against her ingroup coworkers-defined as those who share the same social identity as the worker-from her out-group workers. More specifically, there are two potential effects that are not mutually exclusive: 1) social identity facilitates altruism and mitigates competition among in-group members; and 2) social identity creates a powerful "us versus them" mentality and intensifies competition across groups.
We gauge how individual workers react to their coworkers' performances and how such responses differ towards in-group and out-group coworkers. Given the relative performance schemes, a worker has incentives to work harder and perform better when her coworkers perform better, since her standing or ranking in the workplace is threatened. However, it is crucial in our empirical estimation to separate competitive responses from other confounding common determinants of performance correlations, such as aggregate market demand.
Furthermore, a simple regression of one's performance on coworkers' performances is likely to suffer from the reflection problem, where the direction of causality cannot be identified and the estimate overstates the true magnitude of the interaction (Manski, 1993) . We address this empirical challenge by exploiting the exogenous fluctuations in the composition of workers in our firm due to employee turnover and temporary absence, similar to Mas and Moretti (2009) . Since we have a worker's performance records across time, we can predict her time-invariant productivity (i.e. ability) based on estimates from a regression model with worker fixed effects. We then estimate how a worker's weekly performance changes with the average ability of her co-workers in that week. Such "compositional coworker effect" is not contaminated by the aforementioned econometric issues since neither the error term nor the worker's performance in a given week could influence the average ability of her coworkers, so long as there is no systematic rule of assigning workers based on their ability. Our field research confirms that such random assignment is in place, and we also present econometric evidence of random assignment following the test developed by Guryan et al. (2009) . Our analysis of worker-level data on weekly production during a 12 month period (April 2003 -March 2004 reveal that a worker works harder and performs better only when working with more able out-group coworkers, but not when working with more able in-group coworkers. The results are robust to alternative measures of average coworker ability. A worker in our setting does not act on the incentives to outperform her coworkers when the source of the competition is her in-group coworkers. Such altruistic behaviors do not arise, however, if the increased coworker competition originates from out-group coworkers. Furthermore, we find differential effects for urban and rural workers. The urban resident workers in our study are particularly sensitive to changes in their rural migrant coworkers' ability, whereas the rural migrant workers are significantly less responsive to urban coworkers. We interpret our findings as unique evidence from the actual workplace on the important role that social identity plays in mitigating or amplifying the pecuniary incentives created by relative performance schemes.
Our results suggest that managers who design incentive schemes without understanding the dynamics of social incentives in the workplace may fail to achieve the intended effects on productivities. Bandiera et al. (2005) and Bandiera et al. (2010) provide compelling evidence that fruit pickers in the UK withhold effort when working alongside their friends under relative performance schemes and conform to the productivity levels of their friends under piece rates. While social identity may lead to friendship and vice versa, they are clearly different (Hogg and Hains, 1998) . We find that exogenously formed social identity could also have strong behavioral impact.
Related Literature
Social identity is defined as "part of the individual's self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 2010) . Economists have become increasingly aware of the importance of social identity and have started to contribute fresh findings to an already rich body of theory and evidence accumulated by psychologists (Abrams and Hogg, 1990; Van Knippenberg, 2000; Hewstone et al., 2002) . A series of lab experiments have shown that identity and affliation with "minimal groups" artificially created in a lab setting could generate powerful incentives for prosocial and altruistic behaviors towards other members within the same group (Bernhard et al., 2006; Charness et al., 2007; Chen and Li, 2009 ) as well as intensified and potentially harmful competitions across groups (Goette et al., 2012b) . However, a number of studies cast doubt on the utility of such lab experiments with minimal groups. For instance, Goette et al. (2006) and Goette et al. (2012a) show that the findings from lab experiments with minimal groups may not all generalize when individuals have real social ties. Furthermore, Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)'s experimental study with real social groups (Ashkenazic Jews and Eastern Jews) points to the value of studying real social groups based on a deep background understanding of the nature of social groups.
In addition to providing some of the first empirical evidence on the importance of social identity in a real workplace, our study adds to a large body of literature on tournament theory dating back to Lazear and Rosen (1981) . A wide variety of subsequent studies have shown that the effectiveness of tournaments could depend on many factors such as size of contestant pool , structure and size of rewards, task difficulty, and variance in participants' ability (Bull et al., 1987; Ehrenberg and Bognanno, 1990; Knoeber and Thurman, 1994; Becker and Huselid, 1992; Eriksson, 1999; Vandegrift and Brown, 2003; Audas et al., 2004; Casas-Arce and Martínez-Jerez, 2009; Boudreau et al., 2012) . Our findings show that social identity is an additional variable that needs to be considered. Goette et al. (2012b) provide experimental evidence that inter-group competition enhances pro-social and altruistic behaviors within a group but also generates antisocial and harmful behaviors toward out-group agents. However, unlike inter-group competition where one has the incentive to compete only against out-group members, the incentives in our setting encourage a worker to compete against everyone through relative performance schemes. As such, our setting presents a unique opportunity to examine three conflicting forces in the workplace-individual competition among all coworkers, identity-induced altruism, and identity-induced inter-group competition.
Our results also complement the peer effects literature by illustrating the important relationship between social identity and the nature of worker interaction. Under piece-rate or team-based incentives, coworker effects could arise from social pressure, mutual monitoring, and knowledge sharing (Kandel and Lazear, 1992; Knez and Simester, 2001; Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009) However, unlike the tournament in our case, the golf tournaments that they analyze have many participants and the payoff is highly skewed. Chan et al. (2013) find evidence of negative coworker effects among Chinese cosmetics sales workers who are compensated based on individual performance where there exists competition for customers. Unlike that setting, the production technology in our firm does not generate any externality. Chan et al. (2013) show that coworker effects could differ dramatically under different compensation schemes.
Our results suggest that social identity is an additional dimension that could mitigate or intensify the degree of interaction. Furthermore, unlike the aforementioned studies which are all in a non-manufacturing context, we provide one of the first studies on the dynamics of worker interaction in a manufacturing setting.
Finally, this paper also contributes to the small yet growing literature on workplace diversity and productivity. On the one hand, a number of researchers argue and provide evidence that heterogeneous work teams consisting of a diverse labor force are more productive than homogeneous teams. For instance, Hamilton et al. (2012) 's econometric case study of a U.S. apparel firm report that heterogeneous teams consisting of workers with diverse ability levels are more productive than homogeneous teams. Charness and Villeval (2009) On the other hand, however, a recent study of a Kenyan flower production plant by Hjort (2011) sheds light on the dark side of workplace diversity. Unlike previous empirical studies in the literature, Hjort (2011) focuses on ethnic groups who are hostile to each other. Such workplace diversity is found to reduce workplace productivity through a misallocation of workplace resources caused by taste-based discriminiation by employees in the short run (or in the absence of complete segregation as a viable option). Our Chinese weavers also belong to two deeply-divided social groups who are unfriendly to each other. In this sense, insofar as the source of workplace diversity is concerned, our study is similar to Hjort (2011)'s Kenyan flower production worker study. Yet we derive the opposite result: the positive productivity effects of workplace diversity. There is a key difference between our Chinese weaver workplace and the Kenyan flower production workplace. The Chinese textile production setting enables us to add a new dimension to the literature: inter-group competition. Our Chinese textile workplace is proven to be a fertile ground for such inter-group competition, whereas the Kenyan flower production plant appears to have very limited room for inter-group competition.
Empirical Setting
The Chinese textile firm in our case study, SCT, is based in an industrial city in northeastern China. Our confidentiality agreement with SCT prohibits us from revealing the actual name of the firm. Textile manufacturing is one of the city's most prosperous industries.
SCT was originally a state-owned enterprise (SOE) but it became one of the first large-scale SOEs to be privatized in 1998. The ownership and management restructure saved the firm from the threat of bankruptcy due to outdated facilities, an aging workforce, and shrinking market. SCT employed about 3,500 workers as of April 2004. In collaboration with a few other researchers, we collected several types of data from the firm during a lengthy study period, highlighted by two separate site visits that included extensive interviews with the Director of Human Resources, the Director of the Weaving Division, a line supervisor and two team leaders at the Weaving Division, and the Director of Data Management (who was in charge of all internal data). In addition, to get perspective from an outsider, we supplemented the site visit with an extensive interview with a longterm consultant for SCT who has been observing the firm for many years. In addition to collecting various performance and personnel data, we also deepened our knowledge of the firm by collecting data from a survey that we designed and administered to all team leaders. The detailed personnel data with which SCT generously provided us included personal characteristics, weekly performance measures, and wage for all of its weavers in the weaving 1 We dropped 12 weavers who have worked for only 1 week as well as 115 observations where the weaver worked for less than 2 days of the week, since we cannot accurately predict abilities for these weavers. We also dropped one outlier observation, where the defect rate was above 10% (the maximum in the rest of data is 2.5%) and its daily output was only 5 meters (the mean in the rest is around 500 meters).
Performance Metrics
At a first glance, the firm's operation appears to be fully automated, as cloths are produced by automated looms rather than weavers. However, a longer and closer observation of the workplace reveals that the weavers play an essential role in the production process.
Problems such as broken threads occur from time to time. Each weaver's main task is to pay close attention to her assigned loom machines and minimize the occurrence of such operational problems; if problems arise, she must solve them quickly and effectively. For example, "good weavers" will detect early signs of problems and make timely adjustments to the operation process so that problems will not fully materialize and hence no defective product will result. Should problems actually turn up, "good weavers" will solve them in a timely and effective manner so that defective output will be minimized. Every product is inspected and determined whether or not it is known to be defective. Due to the problem-solving nature of their main task, SCT constantly emphasizes to their weavers the importance of quality and asks them to work toward "zero defect."
The firm keeps three performance-related records for each weaver each week: total output produced, days worked, and defective output produced. From these three variables, we calculated the following two performance measures for weaver i in week t:
(1)
These are defect rate (our measure of quality) and average daily nondefective output (our measure of quantity), respectively. We scaled the variables to make the regression coefficients more readable. Daily nondefective output is measured in 10 meters and defect rate is out of 100.
Based on demand for output, at the beginning of each week SCT develops the upcoming week's detailed production plan with specific numbers for planned output, days worked, and defective output assigned to each individual weaver. However, the problem-solving nature of a weaver's job at SCT implies that discretionary efforts are crucial for quality control, but not for quantity. The correlation between the planned and actual DayOut it is 0.9562 whereas the correlation between the planned and actual Def Rate it is only 0.0957. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the planned and actual performance measures as well as wage. On average, a weaver produces 545 meters of nondefective output in an 8-hour work day and has a defect rate of 0.24% per week. As expected, the mean and standard deviation of the planned DayOut it are similar to those of the actual DayOut it , but the mean and standard deviation of the actual Def Rate it are much smaller than the planned. Although "zero defect" is emphasized in the workplace, there does not exist a week where zero defect rate is actually achieved. The mean of DaysW orked it is around 6.27 days, where a day is defined as an 8-hour work period. Thus, it is possible for a weaver to work more than seven "days" a week. The average weekly wage earned by a weaver, W age it , is around 148 in Chinese Renminbi, which is equivalent to around $18 in 2004 US Dollars.
Composition of Workers
SCT has six weaving rooms and uses a standard three-shift operation, so there are 18 departments defined by combinations of locations and shifts. Each weaver is assigned to one shift and one weaving room, and does not change her shift or location. We define the coworkers of a weaver to be the other weavers that work in the same department, i.e. during the same shift in the same weaving room. There is no team production at the weaving section of SCT. Each weaver is responsible for her own output while working alongside her coworkers. The production technology itself generates no externality in productivity. Onthe-job interactions among weavers are also limited because each weaver is required to pay undivided attention to her machines. However, a weaver may still influence her coworkers' behaviors through her mere presence in the department.
While a weaver does not change her department, the composition of coworkers changes from week to week due to employee turnover and temporary absence. all of them have graduated from junior high school but have not attended high school.
Relative Performance Scheme
The department is the primary organizational unit at SCT, and many workplace activities are organized at the departmental level. For instance, in addition to regular weekly departmental meetings, each department holds a training session and skill contest after work at least once a week, with the goal of enhancing workers' skill levels. Through such departmental activities, each weaver learns about her coworkers in general and their capabilities in particular. We also use wage regressions to formally establish relative performance as an important part of a weaver's compensation. We estimate:
where i denotes the worker, t denotes the week, and j denotes the combination of the shift and location; w it is the average daily wage of worker i in week t, and y it is the set of own performance measures (Def Rate it , DayOut it , and their quadratic terms). Additional controls include demand (measured by the planned performance measures and number of workers in the same department), week dummies, and month dummies interacted with department dummies. Columns (3) and (4) consider an alternative way of measuring relative performance-two indicator variables on whether a worker outperforms the average Def Rate and DayOut of her coworkers in the same department in week t. Conditional on having the same quantity and quality of output, a worker receives an approximately 1.5% pay increase if she outperforms her coworkers in the quality of output, but not when she outperforms in quantity. Again the results are robust to including various controls.
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The last column considers both sets of relative performance measures simultaneously.
Reassuringly, the estimates coefficients on both relative performance measures in quality change little and remain statistically significant, pointing to the universal presence of relative performance incentives for all workers in the department. In other words, the weaver has an incentive to improve her ranking regardless of whether she performs above or below the average. For instance, consider a below-average performer and suppose the average performance of her coworkers improves. Since she is already a below-average performer, she will be even more likely to be a below-average performer as a result of the rise in the average performance of her coworkers. As such, the rising average performance of her coworkers will not motivate her to work harder if outperforming the average coworker in Def Rate were the only significant relative performance measure. However, Column (5) shows that even after controlling for "Outperform the average coworker in Def Rate," the estimated coefficient on ranking within department in Def Rate is still significant. The rising average performance in quality of her coworkers will still motivate the below-average performer to work harder since her wage is sensitive to her ranking.
3
Likewise, the rising average performance of the coworkers will also motivate an aboveaverage performer (even the top performer) to work harder since her pay is linked to her ranking. In addition, every year the company selects "model workers" and provides them with nontrivial prizes. For example, during 2002 just before our data collection began, about 40 model workers were selected and awarded with a trip to Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, staying at 3-star hotels. Though the selection criteria are rather general and subjective, it is quite conceivable that many above-average performers are motivated to become a model worker by consistently achieving high ranking in the department. Furthermore, the ranking system as well as the selection of model workers may generate nonpecuniary incentives associated with status and recognition (Moldovanu et al., 2007; Vidal and Nossol, 2011) . Table 3 also confirms that quality control is extremely important in the work place.
Decreasing Def Rate it by 0.18, which is approximately one standard deviation across all shifts and locations, increases wage by nearly 8%. In contrast, increasing the output has insiginificant impact on wage, which is consistent with our field observation that the quantity of output largely conforms to the production plan. However, working in an urban city in China does not automatically make someone an urban resident. Instead, a highly rigid housing registration system ("hukou") determines whether someone is "rural" or "urban," mostly based on the registration of her parents (see Chan and Zhang, 1999 for a comprehensive discussion of the "hukou" system). Institutional rigidity, limited quota, and lack of transparency in the process make it extremely difficult for individuals with a "rural" status to transfer to an "urban" status. The vast majority of rural migrant workers in urban areas rely on a temporary residence permit, which entitles them to minimal access to social welfare programs such as health care and subsidized housing.
Furthermore, rural migrant workers tend to lack access to high-paying jobs and experience wage discrimination on the job (Huang, 2001; Lu and Song, 2006) . They are often likely to receive negative and discriminatory attitude from urban residents, who feel that rural migrant workers have taken jobs away and made the city more crowded, dangerous, and dirty (Solinger, 1999; Nielsen et al., 2006) . Letters from rural migrant women workers in Shenzhen (one of the first coastal city in the South to experience economic reforms and a huge influx of rural workers), documented in Ngai (2005), suggest that they feel "no matter how many years they spent there, in the drudgery of labor they would always be recognized as outsiders"
and "disguis[ing] their rural identity could only result in reinforcing their class...differences."
Using field experiments on Chinese elementary school students, Afridi et al. (2012) show that social identity derived from one's urban or rural status significantly impacts the students' responses to economic incentives.
It is unlikely that SCT is exempt from the deep-rooted rural/urban social divide. The
Director of Human Resources also confirms that social interactions happen differently for the rural and urban weavers at SCT. The rural weavers are mostly young single women from rural villages of Hebei Province. All of them live in the company dormitory free of charge (five or six per room). After work they return to the same dorm, eat dinner together, and often socialize amongst themselves. In contrast, the urban weavers mostly live in the city where the factory is located and tend to commute from their homes. Thus, the segregated social interactions are likely to reinforce group identity. Table 2 shows that around 67% of weavers are rural migrants and most of the departments have more rural migrants than urban residents.
Empirical Strategy and Results
There are two ways that coworker effects could be present. First, a weaver may work harder when working with more able coworkers ( "compositional coworker effects"). Second, she may work harder if she notices that her coworkers are putting in more effort ("contemporaneous coworker effects"). The identification of contemporaneous coworker effects is difficult due to the reflection problem, where the direction of causality cannot be identified and the estimate overstates the true magnitude of worker interaction (Manski, 1993) . Furthermore, they are unlikely to exist at SCT, since each weaver must pay undivided attention to her machines. In contrast, the department meetings and skill contests clearly allow and encourage each weaver to observe her coworkers' abilities and compare herself against them. Thus, we focus on estimating the compositional coworker effects, and our identification comes from the observation that changes in the composition of coworkers are exogenous to the weaver.
Estimating Permanent Productivity and Verifying Random Assignment to Departments
To estimate compositional coworker effects, we first need to predict the time-invariant productivity (ability) of each individual weaver with precision. We do so with a specification that controls for an extensive list of covariates:
where C jt is the set of week dummies interacted with the combination of shift and location dummies and M it is a set of 287 coworker dummy variables controlling for the presence of coworkers. For instance, the dummy variable "coworker1" in week t takes a value of 1 if worker 1 is a coworker to the focal worker i with i = 1 in week t. Ideally, we would like to control for all possible compositions of coworkers, i.e. all the combinations of dummies in M it (conditional on being realized at the workplace). However, doing so would require estimating over 5,500 dummies in addition to the existing covariates using less than 10,000 observations and raise serious concern about the lack of power. We assume that the combination of C jt and M it sufficiently purges the coworker effects. In Section 4.3, we also show that our key results are robust to relaxing this assumption. We include DayOut it and DaysW orked it so that we can measure each weaver's ability to maintain high quality of the output, holding the quantity and length of work time constant. 4 We exclude planned Def Rate it because we are not measuring the ability to outperform the plan.
According to Figure 1 which plots the kernel density of ability i from Equation (4), there is substantial variation in the predicted permanent productivity. If the assignment of coworkers were non-random, then it is possible that unobserved factors other than compositional changes could drive the estimated coworker effects. Our field research at SCT points to the absence of any explicit or implicit rules of assigning weavers, and we provide two sets of results that confirm the absence of systematic assignment statistically. First, we test whether a high-ability weaver is more likely to work with other high-ability weavers at the same time.
To do so, we employ the bias-correction method in Guryan et al. (2009) and run the following regression:
where a i is the predicted permanent productivity of the focal weaver i, a −i,jt is the average predicted permanent productivity of weaver i's coworkers in week t, and a −i,j is the average predicted permanent productivity of all of weaver i's possible coworkers, i.e. anyone who has ever worked in the combination j of shift and location. Since workers do not change shift or location, their predicted permanent productivities also include potential shift and location fixed effects. Thus, we control for D j , which is the set of shift times location dummies.
The coefficient β in Equation (5) indicates whether more able weavers are matched with other more able coworkers at time t. Since one cannot be her own coworker, the pool that the coworkers at time t are drawn from for a high-ability focal worker has a lower average permanent productivity than for a low-ability focal worker. This is because the focal worker is excluded from the otherwise identical pool. Thus, without controlling for a −i,j , the estimated β has a downward bias, and the bias is more severe for smaller pools (Guryan et al., 2009 ). By construction, a i = N a j − (N − 1)a −i,j where a j is the average ability of everyone ever present in the combination of shift and location including worker i, and N is the total number of those workers. Since the shift interacted with location dummies fully absorb N a j , γ should be close to the mean of −(N − 1) across all shifts and locations, which is around −15. The coefficient β indicates whether more able weavers are matched with other more able coworkers in week t. The null hypothesis of random assignment is that β is zero.
Panel A in Table 4 confirms that the permanenet productivies of weavers in a given week are not correlated. Columns (A1) and (A2) use the bias-correction method and include a −i,j , while Columns (A3) and (A4) show the results without controling for a −i,j . As expected, the estimated γ is close to −15 and significant at the 1 percent level. More importantly, the estimated β is close to zero and highly insignificant, and the results are robust to the inclusion of week fixed effects. Similar to Guryan et al. (2009), we also find that not controlling for a −i,j introduces a negative bias in the coefficient estimates of β.
Second, we show that the composition of coworkers is not driven by aggregate demand, using the following first difference model:
where y it is the focal worker's planned Def Rate it or DayOut it , and n jt is the number of coworkers in week t. As in Equation (5), a −i,jt is the average predicted permanent productivity of worker i's coworkers in week t. We also control for week dummies.
Panel B in Table 4 shows that there are no correlations between the average permanent productivity of coworkers and the planned quantity or quality of the focal weaver's output.
The estimated βs in Equation (6) are highly insignificant. Thus, it is not the case that, for instance, more able coworkers are present when the weaver is facing challenging production plans. Taken together, the results in Table 4 support our field observation that there are no systematic rules of assigning weavers in SCT.
Estimating the Coworker Effects
Having established the random assignment of coworkers, we are now ready to specify our first-difference models:
where i denotes a weaver, t denotes a week, j denotes a department, and g denotes a group
(rural or urban); a −i,jt is the average ability of worker i's coworkers, a −i,gjt is the average ability of worker i's in-group coworkers, and a −g,jt is the average ability of worker i's outgroup coworkers. Controls include first differences in the number of coworkers (Equation (7)) or the numbers of in-group and out-group coworkers (Equation (8) and (9)), DayOut it , days worked, and week dummies. The advantage of using first-differences models is that we do not need to control for any time-invarying individual characteristics such as gender or education, nor do we need to worry about any unobserved time-invarying determinants of performance. We do not include experience in the regression as they are controlled for by the week dummies.
The key coefficient of interest α 0 in Equation (7) measures how the focal weaver's performance changes with the average ability of her coworkers. If the tournament incentives are effective overall, we should see a positive and significant estimate for α 0 . This is because the monetary and psychological rewards of outperforming one's coworkers and improving one's ranking will generate competition in the department. When the coworkers are better, a weaver will put in more effort and improve her performance as well.
The parameter β 0 in Equation (8) measures how the focal weaver's performance changes with the average ability of her in-group coworkers, while β 1 measures the effect of a change in the average ability of her out-group coworkers. Group identity will encourage altruistic behaviors toward in-group members and enhance inter-group competitions. Thus, a weaver will only put in more effort to compete against her out-group coworkers but not her in-group coworkers. We expect only β 1 to be significant and positive if the workers compete against their out-group coworkers but not their in-group coworkers.
Finally, it is possible that rural workers may have a stronger identity since they live together and share more social interaction. On the other hand, urban workers may also form a stronger identity and act particularly competitive against the rural workers if they perceive the latter group as "outsiders." The differences in the group dynamics at SCT are empirically tested by γ 1 and γ 3 in Equation (9). Table 5 presents the OLS estimates of the three equations in Section 4.2 with and without controlling for the week dummies. Since the key independent variables (the ability measures)
Regression Results
are predicted from other regressions, we bootstrap the standard errors with 2000 repetitions and cluster the standard errors at the individual level. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5 suggest that on average, a weaver performs better when working with better coworkers, but the effect is not statistically significant after controlling for the weekly dummies. The results in
Columns (3) and (4) confirm that workers only compete against their out-group coworkers but not the in-group coworkers: the estimates of β 1 are positive and significant at the 10% level, and the estimates of β 0 are slightly negative but insignificant. When the average innate ability in quality control of her out-group coworkers improves by one standard deviation (around 0.2 percentage points) as a result of exogenous compositional changes, the weaver's own defect rate would fall by close to 0.033 percentage points, ceteris paribus. The size of the estimated coworker effect from out-group coworkers is plausible and economically meaningful; Table 3 implies that a 0.033 percentage-point improvement in Def Rate would increase one's wage by about 1.2%, holding the worker's relative performance constant. In contrast, the estimates of β 0 are considerably smaller and insignificant, suggesting that a worker's performance does not respond to the compositional changes of her ingroup coworkers. Columns (5) and (6) suggest that urban resident weavers are significantly more competitive towards rural migrant workers than the other way around.
Sub-sample Estimates, Falcification Tests, and Robustness Checks
We estimate Equation (8) for two different sub-samples and report the results in Table 6 .
The sample in Column (1) in Table 6 includes the workers whose have worked for SCT for more than five years (260 weeks) at the beginning of the sample; and the sample in Column (2) includes those who worked for more than 33 weeks during the 53-week study period. For both groups of workers, we find similar results to the full-sample estimates, suggesting that our results are not driven by less experienced workers or temporary workers. Table 7 reports the results from additional falcification tests and robustness checks.
Columns (1) and (2) estimate an equation similar to Equation (8) but uses the focal worker's planned Def rate as the dependent variable. Since the production plan is set ahead of time, it should not be affected by the composition of the in-group and out-group coworkers, and the results confirm our expectation. Columns (3) and (4) use the actual Def rate as the dependent variable. However, instead of the average coworker abilities, we use the proportions of "above-median" in-group and out-group coworkers as the key right-hand side variables, which are more robust to measurement errors in the predicted abilities. A worker is "above-median" if her predicted ability is above the median of everyone who has worked in the department. We find qualitatively similar results that an increase in the proportion of outgroup "above-median" coworkers decreases the focal weaver's defect rate, while a change in the proportion of ingroup "above-median" coworkers has no effect. These results provide additional evidence that the tournament incentive effect is only effective across the social networks but not within the networks in our setting.
Implications on Assignment and Hiring
Our results suggest that the positive incentive effect of tournament will be greater in the integrated workplace (where workers belonging to different social networks coexist in the same workplace) than in the segregated workplace (all workers in the same workplace belong to the same social network). More specifically, the management at SCT can maximize competition by matching high ability rural migrant workers with urban resident workers. It also follows from our results that a new hire who is a high ability rural worker should be assigned to a department with many urban workers, whereas the opposite would be true for a relatively low ability new rural worker.
As discussed in Section 2, when workers who belong to different social groups work in joint production as in the case of the Kenyan flower production plant in Hjort (2011) , the integrated workplace may suffer an efficiency loss resulting from misallocation of resources.
As such, the integrated workplace is not always productivity-enhancing, and management ought to pay particular attention to the nature of production when deliberating on the formation of the integrated workplace.
Conclusion
This paper has combined two important literatures in personnel economics and management that have largely developed independently of each other: tournament and social identity. On one hand, the tournament literature shows that the use of relative performance incentive or tournament in organizations promotes competition among coworkers. While such tournament-induced competition among coworkers has been shown to lead to higher individual productivity, the literature has also drawn attention to the dark side of tournament competition-limited cooperation among coworkers and even sabotage. On the other hand, the social identity literature points to social identity as an important social construct that can mitigate self-interest and promote altruistic behaviors. In this paper we have examined what would happen when tournament meets social identity.
We have taken advantage of an unusual opportunity to study a Chinese textile firm in which every weaver in the same workplace has a tournament incentive to outperform her coworkers in general, and in which there is a natural division of all weavers into two distinct groups-urban resident and rural migrant workers. The rural/urban divide of workers in Chinese factories and each worker's strong identification with her natural group (which often results in a powerful "us versus them" mentality) are well documented. Moreover, the powerful divide between rural migrant and urban resident workers in Chinese factories had been formed historically and institutionally long before our weavers arrived at the firm. In other words, we are free from the problem of endogenous group formation to which nonexperimental studies are often subject. We have found that tournament indeed generates competition, but not among workers who share the same social identity. In other words, tournament incentive does not apply to in-group coworkers who belong to the group, while it remains fully applicable to out-group coworkers.
Our results provide a potentially important new insight for management who might be interested in introducing tournament. When management considers introducing tournament (or any type of relative performance incentive scheme) in addition to standard considerationsprize size, size of the contestant pool, nature and magnitude of uncertainty, and viability of alternative schemes (such as piece rate)-our findings imply that she ought to pay particular attention to the social network and group identity in the workplace. The introduction of tournament will certainly generate a general incentive for the worker to outcompete her coworkers. However, in the presence of social identities in the workplace, tournament will also bring about rather complex group dynamics-the worker will ease her competitive spirit against her in-group coworkers while maintaining or perhaps even strengthening her competitive spirit against her out-group workers.
By taking advantage of the presence of social identities in the workplace, management can design and implement tournament that maximizes the beneficial effect of tournament and minimizes its "dark side." For instance, the tournament-induced competition may be particularly counter-productive when workers have complementary skills. Our study suggests that managers could still take advantage of tournaments if workers with complementary skills belong to the same social groups. Furthermore, with an existing tournament incentive in place, management needs to think carefully about hiring and firing decisions, as changes in the composition of workers could influence the interplay of social identity and tournament incentives.
Finally we acknowledge that our study is a case study of a Chinese textile firm and hence that our findings and their implications ought to be interpreted as such. Any definitive conclusion will have to wait till the external validity of our findings is tested by follow-up studies using data from other firms and other countries. Notes: This figure plots the kernel density of the workers' predicted permanent producitvity from estimating Equation (4). Additional controls include number of workers in the department in week t, planned Def Rate it , and planned DayOut it , and week dummies. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Notes: All standard errors are bootstrapped with 2000 repetitions and clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. (1) and (2)), the numbers of in-group and out-group coworkers (Columns (3)-(6)), focal worker's daily output, and days worked in a week. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01. Notes: All standard errors are bootstrapped with 2000 repetitions and clustered at the individual level. Additional controls include changes in the numbers of in-group and out-group coworkers, focal worker's daily output, and days worked in a week. * p < 0.10 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01.
